IIT Willing Dupes at Lataminah – 24 March 2017

The OPCW-IIT deemed that sarin was used as a weapon at Lataminah, Syria on March 24, 2017. In this study of the available evidence, I look to see if their finding is based upon evidence or rather guided by political bias.

Date of Report Commencement: 1 August 2020

Date of publication: 26 October 2020

Introduction

At approximately 6:00 on 24 March 2017, an Su-22 military airplane belonging to the 50th Brigade of the 22nd Air Division of the Syrian Arab Air Force, departing from Shayrat airbase, dropped an M4000 aerial bomb containing sarin in southern Ltamenah, affecting at least 16 persons.

OPCW-IIT Report, S/1867/2020, page 2

The OPCW-IIT (Investigation and Identification Team) concluded in their report, dated 8th April 2020, that the Syrian military had dropped a sarin bomb on a field outside the town of Lataminah on the 24th March 2017.

Previous to the IIT report was the OPCW-FFM (Fact Finding Mission) report dated 13th June 2018.

The FFM concludes that sarin was very likely used as a chemical weapon in the south of Ltamenah on 24 March 2017.

OPCW FFM Report, S/1636/2018, page 29

Whilst both teams supply photographs of the cylinder found at the alleged 25th March chlorine attack and fragments of a bomb found at the site of the alleged 30th March sarin attack – neither team offers any evidence that an attack on the 24th March took place. In fact, the IIT points to “videos” recorded on the 26th March as proof of an attack on the 24th March yet proceeds to keep those secret.

The IIT assessed videos of the area, including their metadata, taken on 26 March 2017

OPCW-IIT Report Lataminah: S/1867/2020, page 34, 7.9

In this report I review the claims of the alleged 24th March attack and ask if there is any evidence to support those claims.

Background

Lataminah is a town in the Hama province in north western Syria. It was captured from the Syrian Army by rebels fighters in December of 2012.

During an offensive to retake the area in 2017 it was originally claimed by rebel sources, on social media, that the Syrian military used chlorine as a weapon on the military field hospital on March 25 and dropped a sarin bomb in a nearby field on March 30. The story goes that these events didn’t get picked up until some time later when the OPCW drew attention to the allegations, even though there was quite a bit of social media attention propagated about them at the time.

According to the OPCW, they themselves only became aware of the allegations of sarin use in Lataminah on the 24th March 2017 during interviews they held regarding an alleged sarin attack in Khan Sheikhoun on 4th April 2017 (the town of Khan Sheikhoun is a ~20 miles north of Lataminah.)

During the FFM deployment to gather facts related to the use of chemicals as a weapon in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017, the team also received samples and conducted interviews related to the incident on 25 March 2017 and during these interviews, encountered allegations of use of a toxic chemical as a weapon in another part of Ltamenah on 24 March 2017.

OPCW-FFM S/1636/2018, page 1, 1.3

Whilst the collection of facts relating to the 25 and 30 March (S/1548/2017, dated 2 November 2017) incidents was ongoing, the team also identified witnesses in relation to the alleged incident on 24 March 2017, in Ltamenah. The interview process for the 24 March 2017 incident started at the end of July 2017. (emphasis mine)

OPCW-FFM S/1636/2018, page 1, 1.6

So up to and until the FFM report of 13 June 2018, to my knowledge, nobody bar the OPCW, was aware there was even an allegation of a chemical attack on the 24th March 2017. For all intents and purposes, it was a claim that appeared out of thin air. Literally.

Let’s take a quick look at the timeline of events.

Timeline – FFM

The Claim

It’s important to draw your attention to how witnesses came to be interviewed by the OPCW.

Access to witnesses was coordinated with NGOs.

S/1636/2018, page 4, 4.7

the FFM coordinated with the NGOs to organise the movement of witnesses.

S/1636/2018, page 4, 4.8

In a previous report I wrote:

Len Phillips was the FFM Team Leader for the Alpha Team in Turkey for this investigation and my source tells me that Hamish de Bretton-Gordon supplied the “Sarin contaminated samples” to Phillips and that Phillips worked closely with the late James Le Mesurier, founder of the notorious White Helmets, to select witnesses to be interviewed.

OPCW: An Institution in Crisis – Part 2, Philip Watson, 2020

The NGO whom the OPCW are referring to above who supplied the witnesses to be interviewed are the notorious “White Helmets” who have links to western intelligence agencies and Jihadist terrorists groups whom they work alongside in Syria.

The Alleged Impact Sites

According to the OPCW-FFM there were 2 impact sites for 2 bombs.

A witness reported being awoken on 24 March 2017 at approximately 05:45 by the sound of a plane launching at least two munitions in the southern outskirts of Ltamenah. The first munition made impact in the agricultural lands south of the city, producing a mild detonation and generating no smoke (first impact point). The second munition made impact 10 minutes later, about 100 meters south of the first impact point producing a strong detonation and smoke. Another separate witness indicated that the first munition contained a chemical that was not chlorine, and that the second one was of a more conventional nature (second impact point).

S/1636/2018 page 7, 5.9
Image SOurce: OPCW-FFM S/1636/2018, page 8

I will add here, that having extensively researched Lataminah, I believe the FFM intentionally supplied a low quality image with ’round-a-bout’ locations for the alleged impact sites for reasons that will become clear soon.

The site marked “1” is alleged to have been the impact site for the sarin bomb whilst the site marked “2” is claimed to have been the “conventional” bomb site.

The Len Phillips lead FFM goes slightly further to obfuscate matters by adding this low quality image:

IMAGE SOURCE: OPCW-FFM S/1636/2018, page 9

In his FFM report, Len Phillips wrote,

Once the impact locations of the incident on 24 March 2017 were determined..the FFM coordinated the sample collection from these locations with an NGO (White Helmets).

S/1636/2018, page 2, 1.7

Yet he failed to share the alleged bomb sites that he had “determined” the locations for. Instead, we get low resolution satellite images with big black circles as if to say, “it happened around here somewhere”. Surely as he had determined the impact locations and identified the samples he wanted to assess then he must have been aware of the exact coordinates of the sites?

Examining the locations

According to the Phillips FFM report:

The wind was reported to be blowing toward the northwest at the time of impact.

S/1636/2018, page 7, 5.13

I’ve supplied a Google Earth image (above) of the location showing the alleged impact points as per the FFM report. Given the Phillips locations are not precise I tried to match them as best as possible. I have also added blue arrows denoting the reported wind direction at the time of the alleged chemical bomb impact.

Why is the wind direction important? Because the official narrative, according to the OPCW, is that the alleged sarin bomb dropped at location one affected “two groups of casualties” and wind direction would ultimately play a pivotal role in the spread of the chemical agent.

..the first group consisted of two families who were sleeping in caves in the southern residential area of Ltamenah;

S/1636/2018, page 7, 5.12

The area denoted by the yellow rectangle is a good example of what a cave structure in Lataminah would look like, which is also close to the alleged impact site. But that is not where the FFM claims the sarin reached.

the second group consisted of several men located in the agricultural land outside the city, close to the first impact point.

S/1636/2018, page 7, 5.12

This claim regarding the alleged “second group” of infected people is interesting. The FFM report says;

As described above, the impact location of the alleged chemical munition was approximately 200 meters east of the location of the second group affected in the agricultural lands, and southeast of the residential location of the first group. This residential area of Ltamenah was described as being a few hundred meters from the place of impact. The wind was reported to be blowing toward the northwest at the time of impact.

S/1636/2018, page 7, 5.13

I believe, as mentioned elsewhere in this report, the FFM have intentionally created confusion and used obfuscation in their report. I will lay this out the best I can.

The date of the next imagery is 21st February 2017, roughly 4 weeks before the alleged attack, so that adds to its relevance. I have added the original imagery as per the FFM report and draw your attention again to how inferior its resolution is. Any attempt to apply a zoom completely distorts the entire image. However, I spent a considerable amount of time attempting to match their “black circle” on higher quality imagery and this is what I got.

The area depicted by the white rectangle is 200m west from location 1 which, according to the OPCW, would be the area where the second group was affected. However, the black circled area in their report entitled, “Location of the alleged incident and primary casualties” is ~100m away from that area. Meaning, either this signifies FFM incompetence or simply fraudulence.

If that wasn’t concerning enough for you, then the second part of their claim will be. (I now repeat the quote I made above for your convenience)

As described above, the impact location of the alleged chemical munition was approximately 200 meters east of the location of the second group affected in the agricultural lands, and southeast of the residential location of the first group. This residential area of Ltamenah was described as being a few hundred meters from the place of impact. The wind was reported to be blowing toward the northwest at the time of impact.

This paragraph is poorly written and could easily be misinterpreted and, I would argue, quite deliberately. I had to read it a few times to be sure what was being claimed. Why not write: “The second group affected were in agricultural lands, 200 meters west of the alleged chemical munition impact site..” and why the use of “200 meters” when referring to the second group but “a few hundred meters” when referring to the first group? Add to this the generic black circles and low quality imagery and you’ll begin to get the picture.

In deciphering the location of the first group of alleged casualties the statement claims:

the impact location of the alleged chemical munition was … southeast of the residential location of the first group. This residential area of Ltamenah was described as being a few hundred meters from the place of impact.

What a riddle. Simply translated; ‘the location of the first group was ~200m northwest of the alleged chemical impact site.’

[A quick point of information on caves in Lataminah. They are built into the hillsides and mountains along with complex and well developed underground facilities and tunnels. The structure immediately north of location 1 is a good example of what mountainous caves would look like.]

The only location that I could find in that direction, that even resembles what might be a cave, is 300m away. Not 200m as per the FFM report.

In the next imagery I’ve brought all the above together.

Firstly, the black circle from the FFM report is said to be area in which the casualties of both alleged bomb attacks were claimed to have been affected. However, as noted above, this doesn’t match with their other claims that casualties were found 200m west and “a few hundred meters” north-west, as these distances take us much outside the “location of casualties” circle.

Secondly, I’ve added the area 200m west where it is alleged the second group of casualties were affected (white rectangle). I also added yellow distance arrows of 200m NW and 300m NW. The 200m arrow is the distance the FFM claims to the caves where the first group of casualties were affected. Again, this is way outside of their black circled catchment area plus there are no caves in this area.

The 300m arrow is the nearest I could find what resembles a cave, but I can’t be sure on that.

This is a different angle of what I suspect could be a cave 300m NW of the alleged bomb location 1. For a number of reasons, I wouldn’t place much confidence in that being cave. I was simply making an effort to follow the FFM’s data.

As you see, it doesn’t add up and even if we were to accept that sarin travelled 300m in the open air, in a dedicated, none deviating direction without diminishing its lethality during the journey, we must also accept that the sarin blew over houses and buildings in its path just to reach what might not even be caves. Even if we accept all that, we must also accept the OPCW got their maps and geolocations very wrong. That wouldn’t be an error, that would be either complete incompetence or the result of allowing themselves to be willing dupes or a mixture of both. Here is their official image again with their black circle showing where the alleged bombs were dropped and area casualties were affected. I have now added a yellow circle denoting the geographical spread that would need to be encompassed if we take their 200m W “second group” location and ~200m NW “first group” locations into account or indeed the ~300m NW “caves”.

In fact, if we take the FFM’s imagery and statements at face-value, none of the alleged casualties from the alleged chemical bomb were to be found in the area they denoted by their black circle.

The Sample Collection

Based on information supplied during interviews, including witness testimony and supporting media files, the FFM identified potentially relevant munition parts and arranged for their collection by an NGO. As a result further environmental samples, including remnants of alleged munition parts, were received by the FFM team on 19 February 2018.

S/1636/2018, page 12, 5.31

As per the timeline in this report, the FFM interviews commenced at the “end of July” in 2017 for the alleged 24 March incident. The fact the FFM don’t give a specific date is in itself highly suspicious but yet it fits with the generic, and obfuscated, data they presented to support the claim there was an attack, as I have outlined herein.

It would therefore follow that it was during these “end of July” interviews of 2017, or thereafter (the FFM doesn’t give us any further details on interviews on this alleged incident), that the “potentially relevant munition parts” were identified and ‘collection arranged’. However, it wouldn’t be until February of the following year (11 months after the alleged attack) that these “munition parts” would be handed over to the OPCW, allegedly. Given the wording of the report it is suggested that the munition parts were still in the crater when interviews commenced and the NGO (White Helmets) were then requested by the FFM to arrange collection. This idea is leant further support as the same thing is reported to have happened in the nearby 30 March 2017 alleged sarin attack. The narrative goes…munition fragments were filmed in a crater, and whilst soil samples were collected and taken away by the White Helmets, they bizarrely left the alleged munition fragments in situ. According to the FFM report into the incident, these bombs fragments would not be collected until July and the remaining pieces in February the following year.

But if that claim is true, that munition fragments remained in the crater, then there’s another quite major obstacle to overcome for the OPCW narrative. It’s called “Harvesting”.

The Harvesting

Let’s start with satellite imagery for 21 February 2017, so around 4 weeks before the alleged attack took place.

Note the soil between points 1 & 2. The next available imagery from Google Earth is dated 30 May 2017, more than 3 months later, yet still 2 months prior to the interviews commencing when “the FFM identified potentially relevant munition parts and arranged for their collection by an NGO”.

I draw your attention to what seems to be harvesting rows beginning at the alleged bomb location 1 and running through the alleged bomb location 2.

It isn’t a massive leap to assume that if these are harvesting paths then both bomb locations, and their contents, would have been ploughed up in the process.

I took this image from Google Images but unfortunately the website is no longer available. Note the circular patterns caused by the harvester changing direction.

This is as close as I could get to matching the patterns in the soil at Lataminah. However, we do know that the land was used for agriculture.

The first munition made impact in the agricultural lands south of the city, producing a mild detonation and generating no smoke (first impact point).

S/1636/2018, page 7, 5.9

The Evidence

This would be as good a time as any to analyse the actual physical and photographic evidence that both the FFM and IIT supplied in their reports to support their conclusions on the 24th March alleged attack.

The trouble is, there is none. Nothing. No photos, no images, nothing.

I scoured social media for any claim, any hint of, or mention of, an attack in Lataminah on the 24th March 2017 and could find nothing.

In all my time researching alleged chemical attacks in Syria the claims are always linked to a tweet or Facebook post, no matter how dodgy or obscure the source is – there is usually a starting point for the claim. But with the 24th March 2017 alleged attack there is simply nothing, anywhere, from anyone.

The claim of the attack was first made, allegedly, to the FFM during interviews they were carrying out in relation to the 4th April alleged sarin attack on Khan Sheikhoun. During these interviews, which began on 10th April of 2017, it is alleged by the FFM that they began receiving information on the alleged 25th March chlorine attack and then during these interviews they “encountered allegations of use of a toxic chemical as a weapon in another part of Ltamenah on 24 March 2017.”

In any event, it was only during the FFM deployment originally meant to gather facts related to the use of chemical weapons in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017 that the FFM received samples and conducted interviews related to the incident of 25 March 2017 in Ltamenah, and encountered for the first time allegations of use of toxic chemicals in another part of Ltamenah on 24 March 2017

OPCW-IIT Report Lataminah: S/1867/2020, page 33, 7.3

As noted above, the only video evidence that is alleged to provide evidence of an attack on the 24th March has metadata that actually shows it was recorded on the 26th March.

The IIT assessed videos of the area, including their metadata, taken on 26 March 2017

OPCW-IIT Report Lataminah: S/1867/2020, page 34, 7.9

Therefore, even working on blind faith (as neither the IIT nor FFM supplies a single piece of supporting evidence for the attack) you must accept that it took 2 days for video footage to be recorded yet there are, allegedly, witness testimony from people who were at the site of the attack shortly after it occurred, on the same day.

On 19 February 2018,74 the FFM received metal fragments retrieved from the crater as remnants of munition parts related to the incident of 24 March 2017 in the southern outskirts of Ltamenah. These were later analysed by OPCW designated laboratories.


The IIT assessed all six metal pieces retrieved from the crater and listed by the FFM. After consulting with munition specialists, the IIT reached the conclusion that, out of the six fragments, two can be linked to potential chemical weapons use.

OPCW-IIT Report Lataminah: S/1867/2020, page 3, 7.18 & 7.19

There are a few points of importance to note regarding the above quote. Firstly, the argument often used by the chemical staging denialists is that “sarin is not persistent”, which simply put means, it doesn’t hang around long. Depending on variables such as a temperature, wind, location (indoor/outdoor) etc, sarin may persist for ~24 hrs. However, here we have ‘six metal fragments’ that contained sarin degradation and by-products, 11 months after the alleged attack took place and with no chain of custody.

Here is the list denoting the aforementioned pieces that were allegedly handed over to the FFM. Strangely “Designated Laboratory 3” didn’t analyse the fragments in question.

According to the IIT, of the 6 metal pieces that the FFM received “from the crater” only 2 “could be linked to potential chemical weapons use.” That would be the pieces labelled SDS28 and SDS29.

But what of the other 4 pieces that also tested positive, allegedly, for sarin degradation and by-products, namely, SDS24, SDS25, SDS26 and SDS27? It is claimed they all contained IMPA. [IMPA=Isopropyl methylphosphonate (first degradation product of sarin) ]

The IIT nor FFM gives us any further information on these pieces. What were they? Why can’t we see pictures of them? Were they from another bomb entirely? We saw that occur with the alleged 30th March attack when the IIT noted that remnants found in the alleged sarin bomb crater were from a cluster munition.

OPCW-IIT, S/1867/2020, page 50

Where were all these fragments stored from their collection in July 2017 to their handover in February 2018? Why would it take 7 months for the FFM to receive these fragments? And how did sarin remain on fragments for 11 months? And so on…

Neither the FFM nor IIT addresses any of these questions.

Eliot Higgins

Most of you will be aware of Eliot Higgins. He is the founder of the US State Department funded Bellingcat project. Their role is to act as an information clearing house for junk data from western intelligence agencies.

I have detailed elsewhere how Eliot has served to give a voice to fraudulent chemical attack claims in Syria here, here, here and here (and throughout this blog).

In relation to the alleged 24th March 2017 attack in Syria, Eliot cites the complete lack of any evidence of said attack as evidence that there was actually an attack.

In this interview of 19th August 2020 on the Gagarin Podcast Higgins would say of the alleged 24th March attack:

..in fact the March 24th report, I mean we looked into this, and we couldn’t find a single post on social media about it, we couldn’t find a single piece of open source information about it. It’s like it didn’t even happen. (emphasis mine)

Eliot Higgins, Gagarin Podcast; 2020

Eliot would then go on to claim that he was privy to a video of a piece of evidence from the alleged 24/3/17 attack from the White Helmets.

We managed, eventually, after, you know, after talking to the Syrian Civil Defence, to get like one video of the site, and they said they had more but they were only showing it to the OPCW. And that showed a piece of debris, a really heavy chunk, and we thought at the time that could be the ballast from the front of these bombs, which is part of these diagrams.

Eliot Higgins, Gagarin Podcast; 2020

As I’ve highlighted throughout this blog, Eliot Higgins works alongside the UK founded White Helmets and has been in close contact with them in relation to various chemical stagings, least of all Douma and Lataminah. Here he simply confirms what I, and others, have been saying for a long time.

Interestingly the only videos allegedly shown to the FFM, as per the IIT, were recorded on the 26th March (as noted elsewhere in this report). Why the secrecy? Why hasn’t this video or *any* of the alleged related images ever been published in OPCW reports? Why has the alleged evidence of the 25/3/17 and 30/3/17 attacks been documented in their reports yet there is nothing on the alleged 24th March attack? What is so secretive about this alleged incident that we aren’t allowed to see this video and the evidence?

But I think the March 24th attack was very significant because that’s an example that shows that these attacks do happen, even with sarin, and that they don’t necessarily get covered even on social media by the Syrian opposition media centres or armed groups. Maybe for a variety of reasons but it just doesn’t mean that because a chemical attack happens we’ll definitely find out about it.

Eliot Higgins, Gagarin Podcast; 2020

Conclusion

Regarding the alleged 24/3/17 sarin attack in Lataminah, there is not a single shred of evidence that is in the public domain that supports the claim. It’s a conspiracy theory. It’s akin to claiming aliens are the cause of crop circles. There isn’t a shred of evidence to support the claim yet in the mainstream discourse, claiming aliens created crop circles would have you consigned to dustbin of nuttersville for an eternity. However, claim a sarin bomb fell on Lataminah on March 24th of 2017 and you’d find yourself being back-patted and fawned over by the various NATO funded NGO’s and their conspiratorial tentacles.

Nothing happened in Lataminah on March 24th. Not a single thing. There was no chemical attack. It was fabricated to lend cover to the fact that as investigations were ongoing into the alleged 25th March chlorine attack there were sarin by-products found on evidence gathered by the White Helmets and handed over to the OPCW. This needed to be explained and the only way it could be explained was to create an entirely fictional sarin attack the day before.

The sarin dilemma

When analysing the samples collected for the alleged 25th March chlorine attack on the Lataminah Field hospital the FFM laboratories would purportedly find a by-product of sarin production plastered over all the samples and evidence presented by the White Helmets. That by-product is DIMP or Di-isopropyl methylphosphonate (red)

You may also have noted 2 blue denotations in the slides. This is IPMPA or Isopropyl propyl methylphosphonate which is a degradation product of sarin.

The FFM further notes the presence of chemicals that may be related to sarin. In the absence of information to the contrary, the FFM does not attribute the presence of these chemicals to this alleged incident, but instead determines their presence as being related to the very likely use of sarin the day before, and the decontamination of patients at this location.

OPCW-FFM Report, S/1636/2018, page 29, 6.6

I found it interesting that the OPCW posited an explanation on behalf of this massive oddity in the evidence. At no point in either the FFM or IIT reports does any so-called witness allege this is why the samples are contaminated with sarin products. Nobody mentions it. Apart from the Len Phillips lead FFM team in Turkey.

But is Len’s explanation plausible? Let’s take a look.

the FFM does not attribute the presence of these chemicals to this alleged incident, but instead determines their presence as being related to the very likely use of sarin the day before, and the decontamination of patients at this location

What location. one may ask? Phillips is referring to the Lataminah field hospital. In this part of his report he is claiming that because sarin products were found at the hospital on the 25th March, and given the 25th March alleged attack was not claimed to have been a sarin attack, but chlorine, then the sarin products must have came from a previous incident. This is when the 24th March story was concocted, I am told by a source that has proven extremely reliable in the past. But even should we leave the source of out this, the evidence, or lack-of, speaks for itself.

Here is satellite imagery of the field hospital at Lataminah and the impact sites of the cylinders for the alleged 25th March attack. Recall again what the FFM report hypothesised, that the sarin products found on samples were likely due to the “decontamination” process at the hospital for the alleged 24th March attack.

OPCW-FFM,S/1636/2018, page 21, 5.59

Note the location of cylinder 2 above. It’s allegedly 50m away from the hospital. Yet in a sample from this location we see a by-product of sarin production. But why would people be ‘decontaminated’ 50m away from a hospital and in a field anyway? And why would you find a by-product of sarin production at a decontamination site?

Next we are told a concrete sample, collected 50m away from the hospital, was also contaminated with DIMP.

What’s more important than that is the soil sample that is said to have been collected 150 away from the hospital yet also positive for DIMP. Given we don’t anymore about the location of this sample, it is safe to assume that they are referring to the alleged sample collection 100-150m south noted as cylinder 4’s location.

The FFM makes no mention of a decontamination process being carried out 150m away from the hospital at the spot it is claimed a chemical attack took place.

Here’s another example of a sample taken 100m away from the hospital that also tested positive for DIMP at both laboratories.

I could go on, but I feel the point has been made. The only way sarin products could be found at the alleged impact sites is if the impact sites were caused by sarin munitions. That isn’t the case nor indeed the claim being made by anyone in this instance. Remember, these samples are from the alleged 25th March chlorine attack. So how else did the samples all contain sarin? Cross-contamination.

All the aforementioned sarin contaminated samples were allegedly supplied to the FFM on the 10/4/17 & 12/4/17. This would be after the alleged 30/3/17 sarin attack at Lataminah and the alleged 4/4/17 sarin attack at Khan Sheikhoun. Given that DIMP is a “by-product of sarin production” and *not* a degradation product, this would point to the the samples presented to the OPCW being contaminated at a location were sarin was being prepared or where sarin products were stored.

Key – OPCW-FFM Report

When the OPCW laboratories would report back that DIMP and IPMPA were discovered on samples presented as being from the 25/3/17 alleged chlorine attack, an explanatory scenario would need to be created. The Phillips lead FFM would opt to suggest the contamination of samples from 150m away was the result of decontamination at the hospital. This is further evidence that fraudulence and outside interference had engulfed the Director General of the OPCW’s office and ultimately that of the Chief of Cabinet. Phillips was a useful idiot and vehemently anti-Syrian and therefore a willing dupe. But he couldn’t have carried out this level criminality on his own. Not without approval from the Chief of Cabinet, S├ębastien Braha, who would certainly have known that the Lataminah incidents were staged. My source has long insisted the tampering of samples and supplying of sarin, at Lataminah, was the work of British Intelligence low level operatives and the name Hamish de-Bretton Gordon came up time and time again. On this Hamish would have worked closely with the late James le Mesurier, leader and founder of the White Helmets, a British Intelligence construct who operate under the guise of a humanitarian organisation in Jihadist ruled areas of Syria. The White Helmets are a humanitarian organisation in name only. Their main purpose are as agent provocateurs who carry out the bidding of western intelligence agencies.

The members involved in the sample collection process were also interviewed, and they provided photographs and videos from the location of the alleged incidents, including those related to the sampling process itself.

OPCW-FFM Report, S/1636/2018, page 12, 5.35

Where are all these photographs and videos? Why are they not now, or ever have been, available on social media? Why didn’t the FFM and/or the IIT supply some images in their reports?

This is all part of the coverup. If someone tells you that a sarin attack took place in Lataminah on the 24th March 2017, as determined by the NATO-IIT report, ask them to prove it. In fact, be lenient, and just ask them to point you to a single image or video that shows evidence that an attack took place that day. The minute you request such information, sit back and watch as you’re attacked and defamed. But you won’t get to see the evidence. For you cannot see what doesn’t exist.

Philip; 26th October 2020

3 thoughts on “IIT Willing Dupes at Lataminah – 24 March 2017

  1. The same patterns are seen in fields in Homs countryside during harvest here:

    http://sana.sy/en/?p=196796

    Also note the IIT upgraded the severity of symptoms and specifically added in the surgical room:

    FFM: 5.22 “All cases are described as being mild”

    IIT: 7.15 “Most cases were considered mild” … but now never mentioned by the FFM… “two casualties were moved to the operation room for resuscitation”

    IIT 9.12 claims an Su-22 flies from Shayrat but there are no Sentry Syria messages for this plane (or a plane on March 30) anywhere over Syria.

    But at 7:46am an Su-22 at Shayrat *does* generate a message:

    https://twitter.com/Sentry_Syria/status/845149942012243968

    All messages for March 24:

    https://twitter.com/search?q=(from%3ASentry_Syria)%20until%3A2017-03-25%20since%3A2017-03-24&src=typed_query&f=live

    Also see a summary of flying activity on Reddit at the time:

    https://www.reddit.com/r/SyrianRebels/comments/61fhr4/flying_activity_for_24_march_2017/

    Compare the IIT’s more exact times for phantom plane #2 on March 30 in 9.12 with the more vague March 24 times of 7.10 (during the spotters own offensive)

    Other links and contradicting testimony here:

    https://timhayward.wordpress.com/2019/06/26/the-need-for-radically-reformed-governance-at-the-organisation-for-the-prohibition-of-chemical-weapons-opcw/#comment-20468

    Also IIT 7.17 explains away “differing descriptions as to the numbers and symptoms” by offering *another* alleged attack. Which the French 2017 National Evaluation linked above *also* does not list

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